Will researchers outside the field of empathic ethologv ever be convinced that at least some nonhuman species are a*ire of the existence of the mental world? I predict that the day will not arrive until a rcvolution in the field o[ comparative primate psvchologv ocrurs. Ironicallv', despite the claims of many. the success ofthe revolution-in-waiting no longer has anything to d<r rvith academic.taboos aga.inst investigating mental phenoinena.
Scyfarth (C&S) (1992) have to sar,, I rernain troubled bv several issues-To begin, C&S displav an apparent unu,illingness to consider the logical possibilitl' that mrrnkevs tru11. lack a theorv of mirrd, that is, that tht'v art, unconscious biological svstcms that have no reflectivc a\r,areness of their own minds or the rninds ofothcrs. As wc pointcd out in our original contn)entarv (Rx'inelli & deBlois 1992a) , this is not a conclusion -it is a hvpothesis that rr':rs dcvelopcd a decade ago from Callulr's research on the phylogenetic distribution of mirmr selfrecpgtition, and it is a hypothesis that can be (and is being) empirically evaluated. Yet But we must always be on guard to remember that descriptions can never replace predictions, and predictions must always face attempts at falsification. Evolution has no vested interest in creating monkeys with minds, or monkeys without minds. Until the description-to-argument cycle is replaced by a predictionto-data-collection cycle, we will continue to be alternately embarrassed by both the paucity and the richness of the mental contents of the complex biologicd systems that evolution has unknowingly produced. 
